

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 GENEVA 07409

EXDIS

USSALTTWO

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PARM
SUBJECT: MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF MAY 12, 1978
(SALT-TWO1742)

SEMENOV STATEMENT, MAY 12, 1978

TODAY THE USSR DELEGATION WILL ADDRESS THE QUESTIONS
INVOLVED IN BANNING NEW TYPES OF ICBMS AND SLBMS.

ASSUMPTION OF EFFECTIVE OBLIGATIONS IN THIS AREA,
WHICH WOULD BE FULLY IN ACCORD WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF
EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY, WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT STEP
IN CURBING THE RACE IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, AND WOULD
CONTRIBUTE TO STRENGTHENING STRATEGIC STABILITY AND
REDUCING THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR.

THE QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN BANNING NEW TYPES OF
ICBMS AND SLBMS HAVE BEEN THOROUGHLY DISCUSSED BY THE
SIDES.

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THE NEGOTIATING RECORD ON RELEVANT ASPECTS WAS
STUDIED, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE PROPOSALS TABLED BY THE
U.S. DELEGATION AT THE APRIL 26, 1978 MEETING, AS WELL
AS THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS IN THE COURSE OF THE MEETINGS OF
THE U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE IN MOSCOW.

I

IN THE INTERESTS OF PROGRESS AT THE NEGOTIATIONS,
AND WITH A VIEW TO REACHING FINAL AGREEMENT ON THE
RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT, THE USSR DELEGATION IS
UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO TABLE A SET OF NEW SOVIET PROPOSALS
ON ARTICLE II OF THE PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY.

WE PROPOSE THAT ARTICLE II, PAR. 1, OF THE PROTOCOL
BE AGREED UPON IN THE FOLLOWING WORDING:

"PARAGRAPH 1 OF ARTICLE II OF THE PROTOCOL

1. EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES NOT TO FLIGHT-TEST OR
DEPLOY NEW TYPES OF ICBMS, THAT IS, TYPES OF ICBMS NOT
FLIGHT-TESTED AS OF JANUARY 1, 1977, EXCEPT THAT EACH
PARTY MAY FLIGHT-TEST AND DEPLOY ONE NEW TYPE OF ICBM
EQUIPPED WITH A SINGLE REENTRY VEHICLE."

WE ARE ALSO TABLING THE FOLLOWING AGREED STATEMENT
AND COMMON UNDERSTANDING TO ARTICLE II, PAR. 1, OF THE
PROTOCOL:

"AGREED STATEMENT TO PARAGRAPH 1 OF ARTICLE II OF THE
PROTOCOL

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THE PARTIES AGREE THAT THE TERM "NEW TYPES OF
ICBMS" IN PARAGRAPH 1 OF ARTICLE II OF THE PROTOCOL
REFERS TO ANY ICBM WHICH IS DIFFERENT FROM THOSE ICBMS
FLIGHT-TESTED AS OF JANUARY 1, 1977, IN ONE OR MORE OF THE
FOLLOWING RESPECTS: THE NUMBER OF STAGES, THE LENGTH, THE
LARGEST DIAMETER, THE LAUNCH-WEIGHT, OR THE THROW-WEIGHT,
OF THE MISSILE, THE TYPE OF PROPELLANT (THAT IS, LIQUID
OR SOLID) OF ANY OF ITS STAGES."

"COMMON UNDERSTANDING TO PARAGRAPH 1 OF ARTICLE II OF THE

THE SIDES AGREE THAT THE NEGOTIATING RECORD REFLECTS
THE COMMON UNDERSTANDING THAT THE TERM "DIFFERENT" IN THE
AGREED STATEMENT TO PARAGRAPH 1 OF ARTICLE II OF THE
PROTOCOL, REFERRING TO LENGTH, DIAMETER, LAUNCH-WEIGHT AND
THROW-WEIGHT OF THE MISSILE, MEANS A DIFFERENCE IN EXCESS
OF FIVE PERCENT."

THE PROPOSAL TO BAN THE FLIGHT TESTING AND DEPLOY-
MENT OF NEW TYPES OF ICBMS UNDER ARTICLE II, PAR. 1, OF
THE PROTOCOL, TABLED TODAY, IS BASED ON THE ACTUAL

SITUATION IN THE AREA UNDER CONSIDERATION AND REPRESENTS A CONSTRUCTIVE COMPROMISE WHICH FOR THE THREE-YEAR TERM OF THE PROTOCOL PRECLUDES THE POSSIBILITY OF FLIGHT TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF ANY NEW TYPES OF ICBMS, BOTH MIRVED AND NON-MIRVED, EXCEPT FOR ONE NEW TYPE OF ICBM WITH A SINGLE REENTRY VEHICLE.

RATIONALE FOR THIS PROPOSAL HAS BEEN PRESENTED BY THE SOVIET SIDE IN DETAIL.

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EXDIS

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UNDER THE SOVIET APPROACH IT IS ENVISAGED THAT A BAN ON EQUIPPING NEW TYPES OF ICBMS WITH MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE REENTRY VEHICLES ALSO INVOLVES A BAN ON THE INSTALLATION THEREON OF SELF-CONTAINED DISPENSING MECHANISMS OR OTHER DEVICES MENTIONED IN THE RELEVANT AGREED STATEMENT TO ARTICLE II, PAR. 5, OF THE TREATY. INSTALLATION ON ANY ICBM WITH A SINGLE REENTRY VEHICLE OF SELF-CONTAINED DISPENSING MECHANISMS OR OTHER DEVICES INTENDED FOR MIRVS WOULD ALSO BE BANNED. AS YOU KNOW, ALL THIS REPRESENTS A MOVE TOWARD MEETING THE CONSIDERATIONS EXPRESSED HERE BY THE U.S. SIDE AS WELL.

THE PROPOSED AGREED STATEMENT TO ARTICLE II, PAR. 1, CONTAINS CRITERIA WHICH MUST BE APPLIED IN DETERMINING WHETHER ANY GIVEN ICBM IS AN INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE OF AN EXISTING TYPE OR OF A NEW TYPE. TAKEN

TOGETHER WITH THE RELEVANT AGREED PROVISIONS OF THE
DRAFT, THESE CRITERIA ENSURE RELIABLE IDENTIFICATION OF
NEW TYPES OF ICBMS BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF
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VERIFICATION AND, CONSEQUENTLY, THE CONFIDENCE OF THE
SIDES IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATIONS BEING ASSUMED.

I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO NOTE THAT THE PROPOSED
COMMON UNDERSTANDING CONCERNING THE TERM "DIFFERENT"
TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE CONSIDERATIONS EXPRESSED HERE TO
THE EFFECT THAT THE SIDES COULD INTRODUCE CERTAIN
CHANGES WITH RESPECT TO THE RELEVANT PARAMETERS MENTIONED
IN THE AGREED STATEMENT TO ARTICLE II, PAR. 1, OF THE
PROTOCOL.

- II

A FEW WORDS CONCERNING THE SO-CALLED ALTERNATIVE
PROPOSAL SET FORTH BY THE U.S. DELEGATION AT THE MAY 10,
1978 MEETING. OF COURSE, IT IS BEING STUDIED.

AT THE SAME TIME, I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS AGAIN
MOST EMPHATICALLY THAT THE SOVIET SIDE ABSOLUTELY CANNOT
AGREE TO AN APPROACH WHICH PROVIDES FOR THE POSSIBILITY
OF DEVELOPING A NEW TYPE OF ICBM EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS.

TO PERMIT SUCH A POSSIBILITY UNDER THE DOCUMENT
BEING WORKED OUT WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE OBJECTIVES AND
TASKS OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS, SINCE IT IS CLEAR THAT
ICBMS EQUIPPED WITH SINGLE REENTRY VEHICLES, AND ICBMS
EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS ARE, AS POINTED OUT IN THE COURSE OF
THE NEGOTIATIONS IN MOSCOW, QUALITATIVELY DIFFERENT
CATEGORIES OF MISSILES, FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THEIR
IMPACT ON THE STABILITY OF THE STRATEGIC SITUATION AS
WELL.

THEREFORE THE SOVIET SIDE PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE
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THAT THE RIGHT OF EACH SIDE TO TEST AND DEPLOY ONE NEW
TYPE OF ICBM MUST CONCERN A NEW ICBM EQUIPPED WITH
PRECISELY A SINGLE REENTRY VEHICLE.

THE NEW PROPOSALS OF THE SOVIET SIDE TABLED TODAY
REAFFIRM THIS POSITION OF OURS.

- III

THE SOVIET SIDE HAS ALSO STUDIED THE NEGOTIATING
RECORD ON THE QUESTION OF BANNING NEW TYPES OF SLBMS.

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE DISCUSSIONS HELD AND WITH
THE OBJECTIVE OF REACHING FINAL AGREEMENT ON THE RELEVANT
PROVISIONS DEALING WITH THIS QUESTION, THE USSR DELEGA-
TION, PURSUANT TO INSTRUCTIONS, PROPOSES THAT ARTICLE II,
PAR. 2, OF THE PROTOCOL BE AGREED UPON IN THE FOLLOWING
WORDING:

"PARAGRAPH 2 OF ARTICLE II OF THE PROTOCOL

2. EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES NOT TO FLIGHT-TEST OR
DEPLOY NEW TYPES OF SLBMS, THAT IS, TYPES OF SLBMS NOT
FLIGHT-TESTED AS OF JANUARY 1, 1977, EXCEPT THAT EACH
PARTY MAY FLIGHT-TEST AND DEPLOY ONE SUCH TYPE OF SLBM."

THUS, ACCORDING TO THE NEW PROPOSAL OF THE SOVIET
SIDE, THERE WOULD BE A BAN ON FLIGHT TESTING AND DEPLOY-
MENT OF ALL NEW TYPES OF SLBMS, I.E., TYPES OF SLBMS NOT
FLIGHT-TESTED AS OF THE SPECIFIED DATE, BOTH MIRVED AND
NON-MIRVED, WITH A CERTAIN EXCEPTION FOR BOTH SIDES.
THIS, AS YOU WILL RECOGNIZE, REPRESENTS AN IMPORTANT
STEP TOWARD MEETING THE CONSIDERATIONS EXPRESSED BY THE
U.S. DELEGATION.

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THE USSR DELEGATION, PURSUANT TO INSTRUCTIONS, ALSO REAFFIRMS ITS PROPOSAL CONCERNING THE AGREED STATEMENT TO ARTICLE II, PAR. 2, OF THE PROTOCOL TO THE EFFECT THAT THE ONE NEW TYPE OF SLBM REFERRED TO IN THAT PARAGRAPH WHICH EACH SIDE MAY FLIGHT-TEST AND DEPLOY IS, FOR THE USSR THE RSM-52 SLBM, AND FOR THE U.S. THE TRIDENT C-4 SLBM.

THE PROPOSED EXCEPTION UNDER ARTICLE II, PAR. 2, OF THE PROTOCOL TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE ACTUAL STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THIS AREA. THE RSM-52 MISSILE IS AN SLBM EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS AND UNDER DEVELOPMENT FOR TYPHOON TYPE SLBM SUBMARINES, WHICH IS ANALOGOUS TO THE U.S. TRIDENT C-4 SLBM EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS AND UNDER DEVELOPMENT FOR OHIO TYPE SLBM SUBMARINES.

MENTION WAS MADE HERE OF THE SOVIET RSM-50 SLBM. I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS THAT THIS SLBM, AS WELL AS THE U.S. POSEIDON C-3 SLBM, WHICH IS ALSO INCLUDED IN THE AGREED PROVISIONS OF THE JOINT DRAFT TEXT OF THE TREATY, ARE THE SIDES' FIRST SLBMS EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS, AND IN SECRET

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THIS RESPECT THEY ARE COMPARABLE. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGREED PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE II, PAR. 5, OF THE TREATY, RSM-50 AND POSEIDON C-3 SLBM LAUNCHERS ARE SUBJECT TO BEING COUNTED WITHIN THE AGGREGATES PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE V, PARS. 1 AND 2, OF THE TREATY, I.E., THEY ARE SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATIONS FOR THE ENTIRE TERM OF THE TREATY THROUGH 1985, AS DISTINCT FROM THE THREE-YEAR TERM OF THE PROTOCOL. THUS, THERE ARE NO GROUNDS FOR MENTIONING THE SOVIET RSM-50 SLBM IN ARTICLE II, PAR. 2, OF THE PROTOCOL.

THE USSR DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT THE NEW PROPOSALS TABLED BY THE SOVIET SIDE PROVIDE FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE RESOLUTION OF THE QUESTION OF BANNING NEW TYPES OF ICBMS AND SLBMS AND FOR REACHING FINAL AGREEMENT ON THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE II OF THE PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY ON A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS. EARLE

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Message Attributes

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